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Abstract
How secure automatic speaker verification (ASV) technology is? More concretely, given
a specific target speaker, how likely is it to find another person who gets falsely accepted
as that target? This question may be addressed empirically by studying naturally con-
fusable pairs of speakers within a large enough corpus. To this end, one might expect
to find at least some speaker pairs that are indistinguishable from each other in terms
of ASV. To a certain extent, such aim is mirrored in the standardized ASV evaluation
benchmarks, for instance, the series of speaker recognition evaluation (SRE) organized
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Nonetheless, arguably
the number of speakers in such evaluation benchmarks represents only a small fraction
of all possible human voices, making it challenging to extrapolate performance beyond
a given corpus. Furthermore, the impostors used in performance evaluation are usually
selected randomly. A potentially more meaningful definition of an impostor — at least
in the context of security-driven ASV applications — would be closest (most confusable)
other speaker to a given target.
We put forward a novel performance assessment framework to address both the inade-
quacy of the random-impostor evaluation model and the size limitation of evaluation cor-
pora by addressing ASV security against closest impostors on arbitrarily large datasets.
The framework allows one to make a prediction of the safety of given ASV technology,
in its current state, for arbitrarily large speaker database size consisting of virtual (sam-
pled) speakers. As a proof-of-concept, we analyze the performance of two state-of-the-art
ASV systems, based on i-vector and x-vector speaker embeddings (as implemented in the
popular Kaldi toolkit), on the recent VoxCeleb 1 & 2 corpora, containing a total of 7,365
speakers. We fix the number of target speakers to 1000, and generate up to N = 100, 000
virtual impostors sampled from the generative model. The model-based false alarm rates
are in a reasonable agreement with empirical false alarm rates and, as predicted, increase
substantially (values up to 98%) with N = 100, 000 impostors. Neither the i-vector or
x-vector system is immune to increased false alarm rate at increased impostor database
size, as predicted by the model.
1 c©2019. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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1. Introduction
Some have predicted that voice-operated user interfaces will be the next paradigm of
human-machine interaction. Given that the consumer market already provides various
virtual assistants — Google Home, Apple Siri, and Amazon Alexa to name a few — it
might be a reasonable prediction. Such services are intended to provide human-to-human
like user experience leveraging from speech and speaker recognition technology, dialogue
modeling and speech synthesis. An increasing number of smart services also enable
users to log-in or authenticate payments using voice (or other biometric traits), for both
increased security and user convenience — there is no need to consult, e.g., printed
key-lists (or other stealable or copiable accessories). The co-evolution of smart device
technology and machine learning [1, 2] has substantially broadened the landscape of
automatic speaker verification (ASV) [3] use cases from its traditional, highly specialized
applications — forensics and survaillance — to our living rooms and everyday mobile
environments. For instance, nowadays, smart phones, virtual assistants and other devices
with powerful processors and wireless connectivity enable efficient on-device or cloud-
based voice data processing, including ASV-based user authentication with algorithms
that would have been difficult to execute on portable devices of the past decades. Early
ASV technology, such as [3], was developed with the aid of far less powerful computers
and smaller datasets. The increase in dataset sizes and computing power has not only
enabled the research community to address increasingly more challenging ASV tasks,
but enabled running more powerful models in portable devices. Much of the progress
in the underlying core ASV technology has been facilitated by coordinated technology
benchmarks, pioneered by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in
their evaluation campaigns [4, 5, 6].
Increased awareness of the possibilities of voice-based interaction also raises concern
about the security of the technology. The possibility to invoke malicious voice commands
from a distance in another user’s phone [7] (potentially even using inaudible sounds [8]),
and the potential to masquerade oneself as another targeted speaker through various
spoofing attacks [9] is widely acknowledged. The latter includes replay, text-to-speech,
and voice conversion attacks. Many of these technology-aided attacks can be combated
through various countermeasures ranging from knowledge-based approaches to classifica-
tion approaches, known within biometric technology standardization bodies as presenta-
tion attack detection (PAD) [10] methods. For instance, specialized binary detector could
be used to verify liveness of a voice sample before being passed to a speaker verification
system. Detection of attacks is possible since replayed speech, introduced through loud-
speakers, has different frequency characteristics than live human; and since synthetic
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and converted voices contain processing artifacts due to training data limitations and
modeling imperfections. More details of different attacks, their effectiveness, detection,
and evaluation metrics are discussed elsewhere [11] in more detail. In this study, we focus
on core ASV technology.
While recent efforts have capitalized the importance of preparing ASV systems against
spoofing attacks, another, more fundamental question remains: how unique the human
voice is? Note that even the performance of an ASV system equipped with perfect PAD
subsystem will be upper bounded by the performance of the underlying core technology
[12]. This raises fundamental, yet thus far conclusively unanswered questions such as,
• Given a large-enough population of speakers (such as 7.6 billion), how likely is it to
find two speakers that are confusable with each other? In other words, how many
unique voices there are?
• Conversely, assuming that we wish to maintain a certain minimum level of non-
confusability between speakers, is there some maximum population (speaker database)
size for which it can be guaranteed?
Answers would enable both technology vendors and users of ASV technology to have
increased confidence to the expected reliability of such systems. By drawing analogy from
the security of passwords, some studies [13] based on biometric information measures [14]
have assessed the strength of speech representations in terms of their speaker information,
though the viewpoint is rarely neither on the population size nor attacks.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to constrain the scope. First, the question
of voice uniqueness is, clearly, ill-posed. In theory, the number of different human voices
is, if not infinite, some very large number: both the organic (physiological) and learnt
traits vary greatly across individuals thanks to differences in the anatomy and kinematics
of our articulatory systems — it would be extremely unlikely to find another voice clone
with perfectly-matched voice production systems and learned traits. In practice, when
working with real-world acoustic speech waveforms, we are bounded both by extrinsic and
intrinsic signal variations. Extrinsic variation refers to the inability to accurately measure
‘pure’ speaker characteristics from imperfect acoustic observations (for instance, due to
imperfect transducer, lossy communication channel, background noise, or reverberant
environment). Intrinsic variation, in turn, refers to linguistic and non-linguistic variation
induced by the speaker him/herself, some of which can be substantial [15, 16]. The main
focus of the ASV research community for the past several decades [3, 17] has been on
improving ASV technology to handle extrinsic variations of increased complexity, though
specific intrinsic factors, such as vocal effort, have also been addressed in the context of
NIST SREs [18].
Neither the extrinsic nor intrinsic variations are deterministic, fixed operations. There-
fore, there are practical limits as to how accurately one can discriminate two voices from
each other. As these limits are clearly a function of the specific types of variations and
distortions (as the ASV community is well aware of), it would be meaningless to attempt
to answer the unconditional question of voice uniquess. The answer depends on both
data conditions and the employed hypothesis tester (e.g., a specific human listener or a
specific ASV system). We might even say that uniqueness of voices is a subjective matter;
a pair of speakers that is confusable for one hypothesis tester A (for instance, a human)
may not be so for another hypothesis tester B (for instance, a machine).
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We, therefore, constrain the focus on statistical methods to address questions such
as the above empirically for given data. In particular, we are interested in the relation
of corpus size (number of speakers) and the probability of a false alarm (PFA) for a
given ASV system, under a specific model detailed in Section 2. The input data to
our proposed model consists of detection scores (log-likelihood ratios or uncalibrated raw
scores) of any ASV system on a specific corpus. This makes the method widely applicable
for the analysis of any ASV system, treated as a black-box.
The reader familiar with performance assessment of ASV systems may wonder if there
is anything new to say about detection scores of a given system on a given corpus. Indeed,
measuring detection errors (including PFA) and calibrating speaker recognition systems
is a fairly standardized activity [4, 19]. So, what is new here? The answer, in brief, is that
in the NIST-style ASV evaluations, the non-target speaker trials (pairwise comparisons
of test utterances against a hypothesized speaker model with disjoint speaker identities)
are, essentially, random pairs of speakers. We use more effort to model situation of
more confusable (closest) pairs of speakers; one could argue a recognizer that handles
the ‘worst cases’ (closest competing) speakers well may exhibit improved generalization.
In our model, ‘closest’ speakers are in fact none of the non-target speakers in the
training set, but virtual speakers sampled from the distribution that models random
sampling of speakers. Specifically, speakers are represented implicitly by distributions
of scores corresponding to pairs of speakers. This allows us to extrapolate beyond the
given evaluation corpus to arbitrarily large virtual speaker populations. Assuming that
the observed speaker pairs are sampled from a same underlying generative process, we
can get an idea of how the ASV system scales up with corpus size, without collecting new
speech data.
While the technical voice conversion spoofing attacks have received a lot of attention
in the recent years, it might be appropriate time to re-address worst-case impostors in
the context of regular ASV as well. The initial spark for this work stems from our recent
work [20] (inspired by [21]) where we addressed a specific research hypothesis relating
to potentially emerging, yet cursorily addressed vulnerability of ASV technology against
itself. The idea was that an attacker could use (public-domain) ASV system as a voice
search engine to identify suitable target speaker (specifically, the closest one), such as a
celebrity or any person who uploads a lot of his/her voice or video samples to the Internet.
After identifying a suitable target, the attacker would attempt to attack another ASV
system (e.g., at bank) using natural (possibly mimicked2) voice. Despite the relatively
large VoxCeleb corpus with more than 7000 target speakers, none of our attackers were
successful in getting falsely accepted3. While good news concerning security of ASV,
the finding was on specific ASV systems, attackers and target corpus. One reason why
the finding in [20] might have been negative is that the attacker’s ASV (designed to be
purposefully different from the attacked one) was not powerful enough. Nonetheless,
2Mimicry is a special skill, based on the idea of a listener trying to match his or her acoustic profile
with that of another person. As the acoustic correlates of speaker identity, as learned by current ASV
systems, remain largely unknown, human mimicry is generally an inconsistent strategy to spoof ASV
systems. This is why [20] included ASV system to first identify targets that are similar to attacker’s
voice.
3To be more precise, in [20], we did not consider hard binary decisions but analyzed changes in the
log-likelihood ratio (LLR) scores of the ASV systems. The nontarget LLRs, whether or not originating
from zero-effort or mimicry trials were far below the range of target LLRs.
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we saw transferability across our two ASV systems in terms of relative target speaker
rankings, suggesting that the attacks might be successful with a scaled-up database. We
argue that there must be a speaker database size (possibly very large) where one is likely
to locate closely-matched non-target voices — effect which we were unable to observe
under the specific experimental conditions. For these reasons, we wanted to re-address
the problem by using a more principled and re-usable setup that requires neither two
ASV systems (attacker’s ASV and targeted ASV) nor fresh recordings. To be precise,
the framework proposed in this study addresses a worst-case attack scenario with the
following two assumptions:
1. Assumption 1: known ASV system. The adversary’s ASV system (used for
identifying closest targets to attack) is the same as the attacked ASV system.
2. Assumption 2: access to target’s enrollment data. The adversary has access
to the target speaker’s enrollment data (alternatively, no domain mismatch exist
between target’s public-domain and enrollment recordings).
The generative model presented in this work enables us to increase the corpus size
indefinitely to establish empirical performance bounds on the false alarm rate, under
these two assumptions. As search queries to the attacked system can be limited and
the enrollment utterances can be protected by template protection techniques, neither
assumption is necessarily realistic from the perspective of the adversary. An evaluation
corpus designer, technology vendor, or a bank, however, may still want to assess worst-
case performance. Importantly, the above assumptions greatly simplify the set-up over
the scenarios addressed in [20]. The methods developed in this study can be seen as an
extension of the arsenal of statistical performance evaluation tools. We address each of
the two assumptions in the empirical part.
We summarize our two main contributions as follows. First, we propose a general-
purpose performance metric, worst-case false alarm rate with N impostors (PNFA). It is
the probability of accepting the closest impostor among N available candidate impostors
selected randomly for each enrolled speaker. As will be discussed below, the proposed
metric reduces to the ‘conventional’ probability of a false alarm (PFA) if N = 1. Second,
we devise a hierarchical Bayesian generative model of non-target score distribution to
enable prediction of PNFA for arbitrarily large values of N that can exceed the number
of non-target speakers in a given corpus. The proposed model allows one to make a
prediction of the safety of given ASV technology, in its current state, for arbitrarily
large speaker database size consisting of virtual (sampled) speakers. Importantly, as the
training data consists of detection scores only, the framework is widely applicable for
the analysis of arbitrary ASV system (or even other biometric systems). Further, all
the model parameters are automatically inferred from data, leaving no manually-tunable
control parameters to be set. As a representative snapshot of the current ASV technology
and evaluation databases, our proof-of-concept experiments include two widely-used ASV
methods based on i-vector [22] and x-vector [23] embeddings, evaluated on the combined
VoxCeleb1 [24] and VoxCeleb2 [25] corpora.
2. Measuring and Extrapolating False Alarm Rates
An automatic speaker verification (ASV) system is a hypothesis testing machine that
takes a pair of speech utterances X = (Xe,Xt) — one for enrollment, one for test — and
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produces a numerical detection score s ∈ R, with the convention that higher values (in
relative terms) indicate stronger support for the same speaker (null) hypothesis and low
scores for the different speaker (alternative) hypothesis. Speech utterances are typically
represented as fixed-sized speaker embeddings such as i-vectors [22] or x-vectors [23] and
the detection score is a logarithmic likelihood ratio (LLR) produced by a statistical back-
end model, such as the probabilistic linear discriminant analysis (PLDA) [26, 17].
2.1. False alarm rate
The detection score s can be interpreted as a realization of a continuous random vari-
able that admits an underlying probability density p(s), with p(s) ≥ 0 and ∫∞
s=−∞ p(s) ds =
1. In the conventional ASV set-up (as in NIST SREs [4, 5]), the performance of an ASV
system is assessed using two types of users, targets and nontargets. The former means
that speaker identities of Xe and Xt match, while the latter means that they differ. We
denote the class-conditional score densities of targets and nontargets by p(s|tar) and
p(s|non), respectively.
Our focus is on ASV security against impostors, characterized by the nontarget score
distribution. In specific, an ASV system is characterized by the probability of accepting
a random impostor (sometimes known as zero-effort impostor), known as false alarm
rate (or false acceptance rate). It is defined as the following non-increasing function of
detection threshold τ ∈ R,
PFA(τ) =
∫ ∞
τ
p(s|non) ds, (1)
where τ is fixed in advance to set PFA(τ) to a desirable level (increasing τ reduces false
alarm rate but increases target rejection rate, also known as miss rate).
As we do not have access to p(s|non), in practice PFA(τ) is usually approximated using
Monte-Carlo (MC) methods [27]. Monte-Carlo integration is a class of numerical meth-
ods that can be used to evaluate expected values of complicated functions. It replaces
integrals in expectations by finite sums with the help of independent samples drawn from
the underlying probability distribution. By using I{·} to denote an indicator function
that equals 1 for a true proposition and 0 otherwise, we write the MC-approximated false
alarm rate as,
PFA(τ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
p(s|non)I{s > τ} ds
= Es∼p(s|non)[I{s > τ}] ≈ 1
R
R∑
r=1
I{sr > τ}, sr ∼ p(s|non),
(2)
by assuming one is able to obtain R independent samples sr from the non-target score
distribution. Here, Es∼p(s)[g(s)] denotes expected (average) value of function g(s) w.r.t.
the distribution p(s). Usually we have just a finite collection of detection scores {sr}Rr=1
with no further knowledge of p(s|non).
2.2. Reinterpreting False Alarm Rate as Averaged Speaker-Pair Conditioned False Alarm
Rate
In the following, we provide an alternative view of the false alarm rate as an average
of speaker-pair specific false alarm rates, useful in paving way towards a new perfor-
mance metric and a generative model designed to extrapolate its values beyond available
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datasets. To that end, note first that the detection scores {sr} are obtained through an
ASV system that processes some pre-defined trial list formed from a finite set of pairwise
speaker comparisons. Thus, the terms in (2) can be divided into groups corresponding
to unique pairs of speakers. In the special case when these groups are of equal size, we
can rewrite the sum in (2) as
1
R
R∑
r=1
I{sr > τ} = 1
T
T∑
i=1
1
Li
Li∑
l=1
I{si,l > τ}︸ ︷︷ ︸
speaker-pair specific
probability of a false alarm
, (3)
where si,l denotes the lth trial score from speaker pair i, Li is the total number of
scores for the ith speaker pair, and T is the total number of speaker pairs, such that
L1 = L2 = ... = LT = L and R = T · L. Here, the inner sum can be interpreted as the
probability of a trial from a given pair of speakers being incorrectly accepted, with the
outer sum forming average of the speaker-pair specific false alarm probabilities.
The above simple reformulation provides a bridge towards our proposed framework
detailed below. As our approach enables extrapolation of PFA(τ) estimates beyond a
given speech corpus, it is necessary to proceed from the empirical averaged false alarm
rate (3) towards a continuous-space formulation. In specific, as illustrated in Fig. 1, we
require a model that enables sampling both speakers and speaker-pair specific scores from
continuous distributions. Note, first, that the distribution of non-target scores p(s|non)
can be seen as a continuous mixture of score distributions between all possible pairs of
speakers,
p(s|non) =
∫∫
p(s|ye,yt)p(ye)p(yt) dye dyt, (4)
where we have introduced two new vector-valued variables ye and yt, viewed as so-called
latent identity variables [26, 17]. Let y ∈ Y be an element of some space Y. The latent
identity variable framework [26] assumes that y is a pure representation of a person’s
identity and that there is a distribution on Y with known probability density function
p(y). Given a likelihood function for the latent identity variable (e.g., meta-embedding
[28]), one can make inferences about speaker identities within a set of speech utterances.
Examples of such tasks include speaker verification, identification and clustering [29].
For instance, speaker verification involves testing whether two sets of utterances belong
to the same or to different speakers. In this setup the unit of observations, a speech
utterance, corresponds to a single speaker identity.
The same framework can also be used in the score domain where observations corre-
spond to pairs of identities. Given a pair of (unknown) identity variables ye,yt ∈ Y, one
can describe the distribution of similarity scores between the corresponding speakers by
the density function p(s|ye,yt). This allows to conduct a test of alternative hypotheses
such as: (i) two sets of scores belong to different pairs of speakers, (ii) two sets of scores
share one common speaker, (iii) two sets of scores belong to the same pair of speakers.
The representation (4) allows us to rewrite the false alarm probability PFA(τ) akin
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to (3), namely,
PFA(τ) =
∫ ∞
τ
p(s|non) ds =
∫ ∞
τ
(∫∫
p(s|ye,yt)p(ye)p(yt) dye dyt
)
ds
=
∫∫ (∫ ∞
τ
p(s|ye,yt) ds
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
speaker-pair specific
probability of a false alarm
p(ye)p(yt) dye dyt, (5)
where the inner integral is the speaker-pair specific probability of a false alarm and the
outer two integrals correspond to summing over all possible speaker pairs.
Given a trial list with speaker IDs, one can obtain the estimate of PFA(τ) using
so-called nested Monte-Carlo [30]. It uses MC estimate of the inner integral in (5) to
compute MC estimate of the outer integral. The corresponding nested sampling scheme
consists of sampling a pair of speakers, followed by sampling a set of scores from the
speaker-pair specific score distribution. In practice, any trial list consisting of T unique
speaker pairs and the corresponding scores can be thought as being generated according
to this scheme. For instance (see Figure 1), the following generative process produces
the scores suitable for computing the nested MC estimate of PFA(τ):
1. sample an enrolled speaker y(i)e ∼ p(y)
2. sample a test speaker y(i)t ∼ p(y)
3. sample ne utterances of the enrolled speaker xe,j ∼ p(x|y(i)e ), j = 1, 2, . . . , ne
4. sample nt utterances of the test speaker xt,k ∼ p(x|y(i)t ), k = 1, 2, . . . , nt
5. compute Li = ne · nt pairwise scores sj,k = score(xe,j ,xt,k) using an ASV system.
Here, the index i runs over all speaker pairs and p(x|y) denotes the conditional dis-
tribution of speech utterances x belonging to speaker y. Here, the last step can be
equivalently re-formulated as sampling from the distribution of scores conditioned on a
pair of speakers:
1. sample an enrolled speaker y(i)e ∼ p(y)
2. sample a test speaker y(i)t ∼ p(y)
3. sample Li scores sl ∼ p(s|y(i)e ,y(i)t ), l = 1, 2, . . . , Li.
Now, the nested MC estimate of (5) can be found as
PFA(τ) ≈ 1
T
T∑
i=1
P
(i)
FA(τ), (6)
where
P
(i)
FA(τ) =
∫ ∞
τ
p(s|y(i)e ,y(i)t ) ds
≈ 1
Li
Li∑
l=1
I{sl > τ}, sl ∼ p(s|y(i)e ,y(i)t ), y(i)e ,y(i)t ∼ p(y). (7)
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Figure 1: Illustration of the steps to obtain the speaker-pair conditioned score distribution. (Left)
Latent speaker identity space. Each element of this space corresponds to unique identity. Small circles
represent a dataset consisting of 7 speakers. (Middle) Observation space. Here, p(x|y) is the distribution
of utterances x of the speaker y. (Right) Score space. Here, p(s|ye,yt) is the distribution of similarity
scores between utterances of the pair of speakers. Samples from this distribution are shown as vertical
arrows. Shaded area corresponds to the speaker-pair conditioned false alarm probability which depends
on the decision threshold τ .
We refer to P(i)FA(τ) as speaker-pair conditioned false alarm rate. It is the fraction of
similarity scores between these speakers being above the decision threshold τ .
The PFA(τ) can be estimated based on either a model or available empirical data.
In the former case one needs a probabilistic model of between-speaker similarity scores
and an algorithm to generate samples from this model. In specific, one must be able to
obtain samples from the distribution of speaker identities p(y) and from the distribution
of similarity scores p(s|ye,yt) given an arbitrary speaker pair (ye,yt). An example of
such a model will be described in Section 2.4. In the latter case, the distribution p(y) is a
uniform distribution over speakers’ IDs and the observed between-speaker scores can be
viewed as being samples drawn from an unknown distribution p(s|ye,yt). That is, the
PFA(τ) can be estimated by repeated selection of random pairs of speakers from a dataset
and computing similarity scores between random subsets of their sessions. Algorithm 1
summarizes a procedure to estimate the probability of accepting a zero-effort impostor,
PFA(τ), given a set of utterances with speaker labels.
One should note that in general case, i.e., when speaker-pair specific subsets have
different number of scores, Li, the estimators defined by (2) and (6) produce different
results. The former estimator relies on the unrealistic i.i.d. assumption and does not take
into account data dependencies resulting from multiple appearances of the same speaker
in a given trial list. In practice, however, limited resources usually do not allow to collect
sufficiently many unique pairs of speakers to satisfy this assumption. As a result, the
estimate may be biased if some speaker pairs have disproportionately large number of
trials compared to the rest. The estimator in (6) compensates this bias by assigning
weights to the terms in the sum which are inversely proportional to the number of trials.
A more in-depth discussion of data dependence in speaker recognition evaluation can be
found in [6].
2.3. Worst-Case False Alarm Rate With N Impostors
As (6) suggests, the probability of accepting an impostor speaker can be estimated
by averaging the speaker-pair conditioned false alarm probabilities. In particular, Algo-
9
Algorithm 1
Input: Dataset with speaker labels
Result: PFA(τ)
for i = 1...T do
Select random enrolled (target) speaker, y(i)e
Select random test speaker, y(i)t
Compute Li scores {sl} between y(i)e and y(i)t
Compute the MC estimate of the speaker-pair conditioned false alarm probability:
P
(i)
FA(τ) ≈
1
Li
Li∑
l=1
I{sl > τ},
end
Compute the MC estimate of PFA(τ):
PFA(τ) ≈ 1
T
T∑
i=1
P
(i)
FA(τ)
rithm 1 repeats simulation of the zero-effort attack scenario where an impostor speaker
is selected at random from the general population.
We propose a new characteristic of ASV systems which generalizes PFA(τ) to attack
scenarios where an impostor speaker is selected among N speakers with the intention to
fool an ASV system. We call it the worst-case false alarm rate with N impostors, denoted
by PNFA(τ). Algorithm 2 outlines the steps to estimate P
N
FA(τ). Here, similarity(·, ·) is an
arbitrary similarity measure between speakers. The similarity function could be defined,
for instance, in a speaker embedding space. In this work, all our models are defined in
the score domain. One possible strategy to select the closest speaker is to sample N sets
of scores from p(s|y(i)e ,y(i)t,j) for j = 1, . . . , N and select the set with the highest mean
value. We adopt this strategy. Figure 2 illustrates progression of Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 reduces to the zero-effort imposture case if N = 1, or if one selects a
random (among N available) test speaker, rather than the closest one to the enrolled
speaker. Figure 3 demonstrates differences between these cases.
2.4. Performance Extrapolation Through Generative Model of Scores
Note that in the above strategy, the value of N is limited by the number of speakers in
the dataset. Here, we describe an approach to extrapolate PNFA(τ) for values of N greater
than the number of speakers in a dataset. Our main assumption is to approximate the
speaker-pair conditioned score distribution p(s|ye,yt) as a (univariate) Gaussian. It
should be noted that this assumption, by itself, does not put too many constraints on
the shape of the distribution p(s|non) which can be asymmetric and/or heavy-tailed.
In the sequel we describe a probabilistic model of between-speaker scores which follows
the generative process in Algorithm 2. It will allow to obtain estimates of PNFA(τ) for
arbitrary values of N . We introduce two sets of latent variables: ηe and ηt. The
variables ηe are shared among N speaker pairs and represent individual characteristics
of the enrolled speaker ye. The variables ηt,j , in turn, are responsible for differences
between score distributions within a set of test speakers yt,j .
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Algorithm 2
Input: Dataset with speaker labels
Result: PNFA(τ)
for i = 1...T do
Select random enrolled (target) speaker, y(i)e
Select N random test speakers, y(i)t,1,y
(i)
t,2, ...,y
(i)
t,N
Find the closest speaker y(i)t,k, where
k = arg max
j
similarity(y(i)e ,y
(i)
t,j)
Compute Li scores {sl} between y(i)e and y(i)t,k
Compute the MC estimate of the speaker-pair conditioned false alarm probability:
P
(i)
FA(τ) ≈
1
Li
Li∑
l=1
I{sl > τ},
end
Compute the MC estimate of PNFA(τ):
PNFA(τ) ≈
1
T
T∑
i=1
P
(i)
FA(τ)
Figure 2: Illustration of a few iterations of the Algorithm 2 in the case of N = 3. At each iteration the
algorithm samples N non-target speakers. The corresponding speaker-pair conditioned score distribu-
tions are depicted as Gaussians. The algorithm selects a distribution with the largest mean value. This
distribution is shown as the one with shaded area under the curve. Finally, the algorithm computes the
probability of the score being above the decision threshold τ for the selected distribution. This proba-
bility, denoted as P(i)FA, equals the area under the curve to the right of τ . Since the score distributions
are not available in practice, one can only compute the empirical estimates of P(i)FA.
The proposed probabilistic model consists of the distribution of observations p(s|ηe,ηt),
which is assumed to be Gaussian, and the prior distribution of latent variables p(ηe,ηt) =
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Figure 3: Illustration of two evaluation scenarios where an impostor speaker is selected among N = 1
(zero-effort attack) and N = 3 impostor speakers. (Left and Middle) Latent speaker identity space. Star
represents an enrolled speaker and circles correspond to the impostor speakers. (Right) Distributions of
scores between the enrolled speaker ye and each of the N impostor speakers yt,j for j = 1, . . . , N .
p(ηt|ηe)p(ηe). Assuming that one can generate random samples of these variables, sam-
pling scores from the model can be done according to the following steps (index i is
omitted for clarity):
1. sample ηe ∼ p(ηe)
2. sample ηt,j ∼ p(ηt|ηe) for j = 1...N
3. sample N sets of scores Sj = {sj,l}, where sj,l ∼ p(s|ηe,ηt,j)
We consider a particular instance of such model where ηt = {µ}, ηe = {m,λ, σ2} and the
joint probability density function of the observed score and latent variables is factorized
as follows
p(s,ηe,ηt) = p(s|µ, σ2)p(µ|m,λ, σ2)p(m)p(λ)p(σ2).
The individual factors are outlined below:
p(s|µ, σ2) = N (s|µ, σ2)
p(µ|m,λ, σ2) = N (µ|m,σ2/λ)
p(m) = N (m|µ0, σ20)
p(λ) = Gam(λ|αλ, βλ)
p(σ2) = InvGam(σ2|aσ, bσ).
Here, θ = {µ0, σ20 , aσ, bσ αλ, βλ} are hyper-parameters which can be estimated on the
training set of scores formed according to Algorithm 2. Given hyper-parameters, the
model can be used to predict PNFA(τ) for arbitrary values of N using Algorithm 3. It
differs from Algorithm 2 in a way that the observed scores are replaced by samples
from a generative model meant to approximate the unknown distribution of scores. In
the special case of the proposed model the PNFA(τ) can be estimated without explicit
sampling of scores. The assumption of the speaker-pair conditioned score distribution
being Gaussian allows to compute the estimate as
PNFA(τ) ≈
1
T
T∑
i=1
1− Φ(τ | max
j=1...N
({µi,j}), σ2i ),
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where mi, λi, σ2i and µi,j are sampled from the corresponding distributions. Here, Φ(·)
denotes cumulative distribution function of the Gaussian distribution.
Algorithm 3
Input: Generative model of scores
Result: PNFA(τ)
for i = 1...T do
Sample N sets of scores from the model: Sj for j = 1...N
Find the set with the highest mean score
k = arg max
j
mean(Sj)
Compute the MC estimate of the speaker-pair conditioned false alarm probability:
P
(i)
FA(τ) ≈
1
|Sk|
|Sk|∑
l=1
I{sl > τ}, sl ∈ Sk
end
Compute the MC estimate of PNFA(τ):
PNFA(τ) ≈
1
T
T∑
i=1
P
(i)
FA(τ)
This model assumes shared variance among score distributions p(s|ye,yt,j) for j =
1, . . . , N given a target speaker ye. This assumption as well as the choice of specific
distributions are primarily motivated by the convenience of computing the posterior dis-
tribution of the latent variables. In particular, using conjugate pairs of distributions [31]
as building blocks in the model allows to devise efficient algorithms to obtain approximate
posterior distribution. This leads to closed-form updates in the expectation-maximization
(EM) algorithm [32] used to estimate the model hyper-parameters, with the details pro-
vided in Appendix I. Further insight to the form of the score distributions implied by
our model (including its limitations) is provided in Appendix II. In Section 5 we provide
discussion of the adequacy of the model assumptions and potential alternatives.
Figure 4 depicts the Bayesian network of the proposed model. A Bayesian network is
a directed graphical model [1] that represents a set of random variables and their condi-
tional dependencies via a directed acyclic graph. Empty circles denote latent variables,
shaded circles denote observed variables and nodes without circles denote deterministic
parameters. A group of nodes surrounded by a box, called a plate, labeled with T indi-
cates that the subgraph inside a plate is duplicated T times [33]. The arrows between
the nodes point from the parent variables to their children variables and represent the
conditional dependencies between these variables.
3. Experimental Setup
This section describes the ASV systems, protocols, and the dataset we use for the ex-
periments with the proposed worst-case false alarm rate with N impostors (PNFA) metric.
3.1. Dataset
A suitable dataset for our experiments has to fulfill two requirements. First, it must
have a large number of speakers to not only train well-performing ASV systems, but to
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Figure 4: A graphical representation of the generative model. Here, T is the number of target speakers,
Ni is the number of non-target speakers for the ith target speaker, and Li,j is the number of similarity
scores between the ith target speaker and the jth non-target speaker.
have enough speakers in the evaluation side to produce good PNFA estimates from the
ASV scores. Second, each speaker in the evaluation side should have enough utterances
to produce a sufficiently large number of scores between each pair of speakers, required for
reliable PNFA estimation. For these reasons, we chose the VoxCeleb datasets (VoxCeleb1
[24] & VoxCeleb2 [25]). When combined, the datasets contain 7365 speakers and, on
average, each speaker has well over 100 utterances, which typically originate from about
20 sessions.
We divided the available speakers into three disjoint sets containing 5345, 40, and
2000 speakers. The first set of 5345 speakers is used to train the ASV systems. The
second set of 40 speakers consists of the test speakers in the standard VoxCeleb1 ASV
evaluation protocol, which is used for evaluating performance of our ASV systems. The
third, gender-balanced set contains 1000 male and 1000 female speakers and is used for
the experiments with PNFA estimation. The speakers in this last set were chosen so that
each had utterances from at least 18 different sessions; otherwise the split between the
first and the last set was random.
3.2. Automatic Speaker Verification Systems
We provide experimental results for two different ASV systems, based on the two most
commonly used speaker embeddings, i-vectors [22] and x-vectors [23]. We trained both
systems using Kaldi [34] recipes for VoxCeleb using our custom train-test data division.
Both systems use mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) as acoustic features and a
combination of linear discriminant analysis (LDA) and probabilistic LDA (PLDA) in the
scoring backend. The fundamental difference between the i-vector and x-vector systems
is that the former is based on Gaussian generative model, while the latter is trained
discriminatively and utilizes longer time context via time-delay neural network. Another
major difference is that the x-vector system is trained with a larger training set leveraging
from data augmentation. For further details of the systems, refer to Table 1.
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Table 1: Details of the ASV systems used in this study.
i-vector system x-vector system
Acoustic features 24-dimensional MFCCs +
delta + double-delta
coefficients; energy based
speech activity detection
30-dimensional MFCCs; energy
based speech activity detection
Background model Gaussian mixture model of
2048 components with full
covariance matrices; trained
using the whole training data
—
Embedding extractor Trained with 100 000 longest
utterances in the training set
Trained using the whole
training data plus 1 000 000
utterances obtained by data
augmentation (reverb, noise,
babble, music)
Embeddings 400-dimensional i-vectors 512-dimensional x-vectors
LDA and PLDA Both trained using the whole
training data; dimensionality
reduction to 200-D with LDA
Both trained using the whole
training data; dimensionality
reduction to 200-D with LDA
3.3. Evaluation Protocols
We used two ASV protocols to serve two different purposes. First, we adopted the
standard VoxCeleb1 ASV protocol to assess the performance of our ASV systems. This
protocol contains 40 speakers, and 37720 evaluation trials with a balanced number of
target (same speaker) and non-target (different speaker) trials. The second protocol is
used to obtain a large number of non-target scores for a large number of speaker pairs
to estimate PNFA. For each of the 2000 speakers in the testing set, we randomly chose 18
utterances so that all the utterances were from different sessions. Then, for each pair of
speakers, we obtained 182 = 324 trials by forming all the utterance pairs between the
two speakers. In total, we had 1 999 000 · 324 = 647 676 000 trials, where 1 999 0004 is the
total number of unique speaker pairs. The above number includes cross-gender trials.
Including only speaker pairs within one gender, we have 161 838 000 trials for both males
and females.
4. Results
4.1. Performance of Speaker Verification Systems
Before proceeding to our proposed generative approach, we validate correctness of
the ASV implementations through standard performance metrics. To this end, we report
equal error rate (EER) and minimum normalized detection cost function (minDCF) [35].
EER is obtained by setting the system threshold τ so that false alarm and miss rates equal
42000!/(2!(2000− 2)!) = 1 999 000 (number of 2-combinations in a set of 2000 speakers)
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Table 2: Parameters of three different detection cost functions (DCF) used in this study. The sys-
tem thresholds (τ) that mimimize these DCFs are used to estimate false alarm rates in the following
experiments.
Ptarget Cmiss Cfa
minDCF1 0.5 10 1
minDCF2 0.5 1 1
minDCF3 0.5 1 10
each other. The threshold selection for minDCF, in turn, is governed by the parameters
Ptarget (prior probability of target speaker), Cmiss (cost of missing the target speaker),
and Cfa (cost of falsely accepting a non-target speaker). For this study, we adopt three
different sets of parameters (Table 2): the first set has high cost for misses, the second
set has equal costs for misses and false alarms, and the last one penalizes false alarms
more. From the security perspective, DCF3 is the most relevant, whereas the other two
DCFs can be utilized in applications where high security is not required.
Table 3 shows the EERs and minDCFs for i-vector and x-vector systems using Vox-
Celeb test protocol (category ‘all’). In addition, we split the protocol based on genders
and also report a result for the ‘pooled’ category, which does not contain inter-gender
trials making the original test protocol more difficult. Our results are in line with the
results reported in the original Kaldi recipes. As we used about 2000 speakers less for
system training, our EER for x-vector system is about 0.5% (absolute) higher than what
is reported in the original recipe.
In addition to the overall performance difference between i-vector and x-vector sys-
tems, these systems differ in their ability to recognize speakers from different genders.
For the i-vector system, the performance for males is considerably better, whereas for
the x-vector system the difference between the genders is smaller.
In Figure 5, we display score distributions for the VoxCeleb1 test protocol and for
Table 3: Performance of i-vector and x-vector systems on VoxCeleb1 test protocol. The original protocol
(‘all’) contains both intra- and inter-gender trials. The numbers under the category ‘pooled’ are computed
using only intra-gender trials from both genders.
minDCF1 minDCF2 minDCF3 EER (%)
i-vector
male 0.43 0.14 0.31 6.97
female 0.53 0.17 0.37 8.80
pooled 0.44 0.14 0.34 7.18
all 0.30 0.11 0.27 5.62
x-vector
male 0.27 0.09 0.24 4.71
female 0.30 0.10 0.24 5.19
pooled 0.28 0.09 0.23 4.75
all 0.21 0.07 0.19 3.61
16
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
De
ns
ity
VoxCeleb1 protocol
Target scores
Impostor scores
Impostor scores (intra-gender trials only)
60 40 20 0 20
ASV score
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
De
ns
ity
Custom protocol
Non-target scores (male)
Non-target scores (female)
Inter-gender scores
(a) i-vector.
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
De
ns
ity
VoxCeleb1 protocol
Target scores
Impostor scores
Impostor scores (intra-gender trials only)
100 75 50 25 0 25 50
ASV score
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
De
ns
ity
Custom protocol
Non-target scores (male)
Non-target scores (female)
Inter-gender scores
(b) x-vector.
Figure 5: Score distributions for the standard VoxCeleb protocol and the custom protocol obtained using
i-vector and x-vector systems. Dashed lines represent minDCF thresholds for ‘pooled’ scores (see Table
3) using different sets of cost parameters presented in Table 3.
our custom protocol containing non-target scores only. The VoxCeleb1 protocol is used
to set the system thresholds τ for the PNFA estimation experiments presented in the next
section. In these experiments, we use gender-specific thresholds obtained via minimizing
DCF separately on male and female trials. Note that for clarity, Figure 5 does not show
gender-specific thresholds, but instead it shows the thresholds for ‘pooled’ category.
4.2. Estimation of Worst-Case False Alarm Rates
We estimated worst-case false alarm rates empirically using Algorithm 2 by randomly
selecting enrolled speaker T = 1000 times. Similarly, we use T = 1000 in Algorithm 3
to obtain model-based estimates. The estimates are shown in Figure 6 for both ASV
systems using three different thresholds obtained using the DCF parameter sets in Table
2. We find that model-based approaches give good estimates when the threshold is low
(higher cost for misses). When the threshold is higher than in the minDCF1 case, the
model-based estimates can be seen as a conservative upper bounds for the PNFA rates.
We also find that the differences between the empirical and the model-based estimates
are greater for females than for the males. To obtain further insight, we depict the score
distributions of the closest impostors for population size of N = 1000 in Figure 7. The
figure indicates that especially for females, the model-based score distributions tend to
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Figure 6: Empirical and model-based estimates of worst-case false alarm rates with N impostors
for various sizes of speaker populations. In each plot, three empirical and model-based es-
timates are shown for three different thresholds. These thresholds are obtained separately
for each plot using cost parameters defined in Table 2. The curves from top to bottom
correspond to the thresholds of minDCF1, minDCF2, and minDCF3, respectively. The
model-based estimates follow closely emprical estimates for low threshold values, but as
the threshold gets stricter, the difference between the empirical and model-based esti-
mates grows. The curves are obtained using T = 1000 in Algorithms 2 and 3. The mean
values obtained using these algorithms are shown together with their 99% confidence
intervals.
be too wide and slightly shifted to the right, which causes higher false acceptance rates
when a high threshold value is used.
Using the estimates, we can predict that for the minDCF1 threshold, PNFA is 95 – 98%
for an impostor population of size 100 000. For minDCF3 threshold, we can rely only on
the empirical estimates, which tell us that, depending on the system and gender, PNFA
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rate of 12 – 28% is obtained for a population of size 1000. Note that our populations
contain only speakers from one gender. If the population would contain speakers from
both genders, the false alarm rates would be lower.
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Figure 7: Score distributions of the closest impostors (N = 1000) pooled together from T = 1000
samplings/simulations for the empirical and model-based approaches. Dashed lines represent minDCF
thresholds obtained using different sets of cost parameters, which are presented in Table 3. For the
strictest threshold, the area under the density curves on the right side of the threshold is larger for the
model-based estimation, which explains why the model-based estimation lead to higher false alarm rates
as shown in Figure 6.
5. Discussion
Before concluding, the authors would like to address two relevant concerns, the over-
estimated false alarm rates at high threshold, and the worst-case attack assumption.
5.1. Analysis of the model-based worst-case false alarm estimation
From Figure 7, we observe two apparent problems in the score distributions given by
the model for the closest impostors: a) they are shifted to the right and b) they have too
large variances. As a result, some of the generated scores of the closest impostors are
too high, which results in over-estimated false alarm rates given by the model. We have
identified three causes for the problems.
Table 4: Sources of mismatch between the observed and generated scores. The generative score model
assumes that pairwise non-target scores and means of pair-wise scores (µ) are normally distributed, while
the analysis shows that they are skewed to the left. Additionally, scores with the closest impostors tend
to have smaller variances than scores with random impostors, which is not factored into the model.
i-vector system x-vector system
males females males females
Avg. skewness of pairwise scores -0.20 -0.29 -0.20 -0.27
Skewness of µ -0.86 -0.99 -0.99 -0.62
Avg. STDEV* of scores with the closest impostors 5.1 5.5 7.5 9.4
Avg. STDEV* of scores with random impostors 6.2 7.1 9.6 13.7
* Computed as a square root of an average of variances.
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First, we found that the empirical distribution of µ, which is the distribution of
score means of speaker pairs, is skewed to the left (negative skewness, see Table 4).
Consequently, the fitted normal distribution (assumed in the model) has longer tail on
the right than what the original score data had. The right tail of the distribution of µ
is where we will find the closest impostors in Algorithm 3. As a result, the scores of the
closest impostors are shifted to the right.
Additionally, we observed that the variation in target-vs-impostor scores is smaller
for speaker pairs with the closest impostors than for random impostors. In other words,
the closer the impostor’s voice is to the target speaker’s voice, the smaller is the variance
in scores between the two speakers. As our model does not take this into account, the
speaker pairs with closest impostors tend to have too large score variances.
Finally, the scores between the speaker pairs are also skewed to the left, which is
another source of mismatch between empirical scores and scores generated by the model.
These observations open two potential directions towards increasing the prediction
accuracy. The first direction is to revise the proposed generative model to take into
account the skew of score distributions, as well as by relaxing the assumption of a shared
variance. This can be done at the cost of losing conjugacy between distributions in the
model, leading to increased computational complexity of hyper-parameter estimation.
An alternative, second direction would be supervised fine-tuning to optimize some loss
function between the empirical and the model-based estimates. As our model is parame-
terized only by six numbers, we believe that a good hyper-parameter configuration can be
found in reasonable time using one of the derivative-free optimization methods [36]. To
give some empirical evidence for this claim, Fig. 8 displays an example where we tuned
our model parameters manually. As seen, the model itself is actually flexible enough
to fit the empirical false alarm rates accurately — but the purely generative training
criterion does not find the parameter values that achieve this. With the manually cor-
rected model, we obtained 54% worst-case false acceptance rate estimate for population
size of 100.000 for the strictest minDCF3 threshold, whereas the original model clearly
over-estimated this by giving FA rate of 70% as shown in the top-right panel of Figure
6.
5.2. False alarm estimation in simulated attack scenarios
So far we have considered worst-case false alarm estimation from the system deployer’s
perspective. From the presented results, we can gain understanding on how many enrolled
speakers systems with specific thresholds can handle without starting to confuse speakers
to each other too much.
Next, let us consider a scenario, in which a malicious attacker is utilizing ASV tech-
nology to find similar sounding speakers to the enrolled target speaker’s voice to break
the ASV system. As discussed in Section 1, the previously presented results can be con-
sidered as the worst-case situation, where the attacker has access to both the deployed
ASV system as well as to the target speaker’s enrollment data. In reality, the attacker
would be unlikely to have access to either of them. Instead, the attacker would first
have to set up another ASV system and then collect some speech data from the target
speaker to perform the speaker search. These steps will make the attack more difficult
as the closest impostor obtained using attacker’s system and data might not be the same
as what would be the closest impostor when using the attacked system and the real
enrollment data.
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Figure 8: Worst-case false alarm estimates for male scores given by x-vector system after tweaking
the model hyper-parameters manually. First, the parameter αλ was adjusted until the variances of
distributions in Figure 7 matched and then µ0 was adjusted to fix the shifting misalignment. As a
result, the model-based estimates follow closely the empirical estimates unlike in Figure 6.
To study the effect of system/data mismatch in the impostor selection, we set up a
following experiment. First, we divided the available 18 utterances for each speaker into
two disjoint sets of nine utterances. The first one was used for impostor selection and
the second for speaker enrollment. We compared this setup to a case, where the same
set of nine utterances was used both for impostor selection and enrollment to address
the effect of data mismatch. Further, we also varied the number of utterances used for
impostor selection from one to nine to see the effect of the amount of data used for
impostor search. We simulated the ASV system mismatch by using i-vector system to
select closest impostors, while the x-vector system was considered to be the attacked
system. This was compared to the case where the impostor search was done using the
same attacked x-vector system.
The results are shown in Figure 9, which reveals the expected patterns: when there
is no data mismatch or ASV system mismatch, false acceptance rates are highest, which
means that the attacks are most successful. If there is either data mismatch or system
mismatch, the false acceptance rates drop. The lowest false acceptance rates are obtained,
when both types of mismatches are present and when the number of utterances available
for impostor search is low.
As another future direction, we consider designing a model for joint modeling of scores
from two different ASV systems suitable for more realistic scenario where the attacker
does not have access to the target speaker’s enrollment data and the deployed ASV
system.
6. Conclusions
Seamless integration of artificial intelligence to our daily lives, including speech tech-
nology products, raises growing concern of their trustworthiness and safety. Our study
resides in the landscape of automatic speaker verification (ASV), or voice biometrics
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Figure 9: Empirical estimation of PNFA (N = 1000) in various scenarios for x-vector system with minDCF3
threshold (see Table 2). ‘Public ASV system’ refers to a case where the closest impostors in Algorithm
2 are selected using the same x-vector system. To simulate a scenario, where attacker uses another
ASV system for impostor selection due to not knowing the details of the deployed system (‘private ASV
system’), an i-vector system is used to select the closest impostors. Further, ‘public enrollment’ and
‘private enrollment’ refer to such cases, where the attacker has access (public) or does not have access
(private) to the enrolled target speaker’s enrollment data. If the enrollment data and the ASV system
are public, the selection of the closest impostor is easier, which results in higher false acceptance rates.
security. One unique feature of voice (and face) biometrics is that, unlike traditional
physical biometrics — fingerprints, iris, retina, DNA to name a few — is that much
of the biometric data is publicly available in the Internet through social media, news,
interviews, lectures, and workplace websites to name a few. An important concern is the
relation of false alarm (false acceptance) and database size: regardless of the selected
ASV technology, given a large enough database, one will eventually have speaker colli-
sions. A technology-aware attacker may increase the likelihood of such collisions through
the use of public-domain ASV system to identify target speakers from a public database
[20]. Even without dedicated attacks, however, the number of different voices (subject
to extrinsic and intrinsic speech variations) is not infinite. Therefore, eventually, ASV
performance will be capped at some database size.
The methodology concept put forward in this study gives us novel tool to address
the dependency of false alarm rate and database size beyond the size of a given eval-
uation corpus. The proposed model produced reasonable match with empirical scores
and displayed the expected trend of increasing false alarm rate as a function of database
size. Our model is general and can be applied to analyze (and optimize) any black-box
ASV system to produce graphs similar to those in Fig. 6, based on detection scores
only. As such, these graphs are predictions by the model — how the ASV system will
behave if one were able to collect more speakers assuming the speaker sampling process
remains the same. Even if it is not easy to experimentally validate the model beyond
a given training corpus size, the general trends what we saw in our pilot experiments
with VoxCeleb corpus are deemed as expected: false alarm rates increase as a function
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of database size and will eventually saturate.
Our work has a number of limitations as well. First, as the results indicate, the
generative model overestimated the false alarm rates, especially for the high-security op-
erating region (high threshold). In real-world deployment of ASV, the detection threshold
τ needs to be optimized to achieve a desirable security–convenience trade-off based on
some development data and application (DCF setting). If the false alarm rate is over-
estimated, the threshold τ would have to be increased (relative to the value it would
have been set with precise knowledge of the false alarm rate), leading to decreased user
convenience due to increased miss rate. Nonetheless, as Section 5 indicates, our proposed
generative model is flexible enough to be adjusted so that the empirical and predicted
false alarm rates will match closely. Our model design philosophy has been simplicity:
all the parameters are automatically learned from data and we leverage from conjugate
families of distributions to enable efficient inference. The suggested future improvements
include revising our distributional assumptions, and combining generative modeling with
discriminative fine-tuning.
Second, our model assumes a worst-case scenario where the attacker has access to
the target speaker’s enrollment data, as well as the attacked ASV system. This is no
different from standard NIST SRE style evaluations where an evaluator reports standard
evaluation metrics (such as EER, minDCF, or PFA) on a given, fixed evaluation corpus
with known trial key. In future, we are interested in extending our generative model to
model interaction between two different ASV systems and across different data domains.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare different ASV systems and database
qualities. VoxCeleb data was selected for the experiments primarily due to the large
number of speakers and the amount of intra-speaker scores. Nonetheless, being represen-
tative of found Internet data, VoxCeleb contains many style, channel and environment
variations. At least for academic curiosity, it would be interesting to repeat our simula-
tions on more controlled database for reference purposes. Further, it will be interesting
to analyze the impacts of i-vector and x-vector dimensionality, dimensionality reduction
of these embeddings, and speaker subspace size in PLDA. Finally, it would be interesting
to apply the proposed methods to speaker diarization or other use cases within ASV,
such as score normalization with increased speaker cohort size.
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Appendix I: parameter inference
In the following we describe the algorithm used to estimate hyper-parameters of the
proposed generative model. We find the values of hyper-parameters θ that maximize
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the likelihood function – the joint probability density of the observed data viewed as a
function of θ = {µ0, σ20 , aσ, bσ, αλ, βλ}:
L (θ) =
∫ T∏
i=1
N (mi|µ0, σ20)Gam(λi|αλ, βλ)InvGam(σ2i |aσ, bσ)
Ni∏
j=1
N (µi,j |mj , λi, σ2i )
Li,j∏
l=1
N (si,j,l|µi,j , σ2i ) dmi dλi dσ2i dµi,j
For many probabilistic models with latent variables, including the proposed one, this
objective function is intractable (cannot be evaluated). A commonly adopted strategy to
avoid this obstacle is to use the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm [32], an iter-
ative optimization method to find the local extrema of the likelihood function. The EM
algorithm alternates between two steps: expectation step (E-step) and maximization
step (M-step). On the E-step it computes (approximate) posterior distribution of the
latent variables and on the M-step it updates all the hyper-parameters of the model.
Inference for latent variable models can be conducted through variational Bayes [1,
Chapter 10] or Monte-Carlo techniques [1, Chapter 11]. We choose the former approach
due to its better scalability in terms of computational costs. The variational Bayesian
inference approximates the exact posterior distribution p({mi}, {λi}, {σ2i }, {µi,j}|{si,j,l})
by a variational distribution q from a restricted family of distributions. The variational
distribution is found by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence from the posterior
distribution.
One of the commonly adopted strategies, known as black-box variational inference
(BBVI) [37], is to explicitly define the family of variational distributions and use stochas-
tic optimization [38] to minimize the objective. Another strategy to define q is the
mean-field approximation [1, 39] which assumes the variational distribution to be fully
factorized:
q({mi}, {λi}, {σ2i }, {µi,j}) =
T∏
i=1
q(mi)q(λi)q(σ
2
i )
Ni∏
j=1
q(µi,j) (8)
but with no further assumptions imposed on the functional forms of the factors. For
conditionally conjugate models [40] this approach leads to closed form solutions in a co-
ordinate descent optimization algorithm which iteratively updates the parameters of one
factor while holding the others fixed. Since the proposed model is conditionally conjugate
we choose to use the mean-field approach due to its lower computational complexity. The
inference algorithm performs the following updates performed until convergence.
Expectation step (E-step):
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• Updating q(mi):
q(mi) = N
(
mi|mˆi, s2i
)
s2i =
(
NiE [λi]E
[
1
σ2i
]
+
1
σ20
)−1
mˆi =
(
NiE[λi]E
[
1
σ2i
]
+
1
σ20
)−1E[λi]E [ 1
σ2i
] Ni∑
j=1
E [µi,j ]
+ µ0
σ20

E[mi] = mˆi, E[m2i ] = mˆ2i + s2i
• Updating q(σ2i ):
q(σ2i ) = InvGam
(
σ2i |aˆi, bˆi
)
aˆi = aσ +
Ni
2
+
Ni∑
j=1
Li,j
bˆi = bσ +
1
2
E
 Ni∑
j=1
Li,j∑
l=1
(si,j,l − µi,j)2
+ 1
2
E[λi]E
 Ni∑
j=1
(µi,j −mi)2

E
[
1
σ2i
]
=
aˆi
bˆi
, E[log σ2i ] = log bˆi − ψ(aˆi)
• Updating q(λi):
q(λi) = Gam
(
λi|αˆi, βˆi
)
αˆi = αλ +
Ni
2
βˆi = βλ +
1
2
E
[
1
σ2i
]
E
 Ni∑
j=1
(µi,j −mi)2

E[λi] =
αˆi
βˆi
, E[log λi] = ψ(αˆi)− log βˆi.
• Updating q(µi,j):
q(µi,j) = N
(
µi,j |µˆi,j , sˆ2i,j
)
µˆi,j =
∑Li,j
l=1 +E[λi]
Li,j + E[λi]
sˆ2i,j =
(
E
[
1
σ2i
]
(Li,j + E[λi])
)−1
E[µi,j ] = µˆi,j , E[µ2i,j ] = µˆi,j + sˆ2i,j
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Here, E[·] denotes the expected value of a random variable.
Maximization step (M-step):
Given an approximate posterior distribution found on the E-step, the M-step proceeds
by updating the hyper-parameters θ as follows:
• Updating µ0:
µ0 =
1
T
T∑
i=1
E[mi]
• Updating σ20 :
σ20 =
1
T
T∑
i=1
(E[mi]− µ0)2
• Updating αλ and βλ:
αλ, βλ = arg max
α,β
T (α log β − log Γ(α)) + (α− 1)
T∑
i=1
E[log λi]− β
T∑
i=1
E[λi]
• Updating aσ and bσ:
aσ, bσ = arg max
a,b
T (a log b− log Γ(a)) + (a− 1)
T∑
i=1
E[log σ2i ]− b
T∑
i=1
E
[
1
σ2i
]
The last two updates are two-dimensional convex optimization problems. Their solutions
can be obtained using numerical optimization algorithms specialized to these tasks [41,
42]. Our approach is a less elaborate version of [41] where we use general-purpose root-
finding algorithms which can be found in any commonly-adopted mathematical library.
The EM algorithm repeats the E- and M-steps outlined above until the convergence.
In our experiments we found that a few iterations are sufficient to reach a point where
any further iterations do not substantially change the values of hyper-parameters.
Appendix II: Score Distribution of the Model is Approximately Gaussian
In the sequel we show how to obtain the marginal distribution of the observations
p(s) =
∫
p(s|µ, σ2)p(µ|m,λ, σ2)p(m)p(λ)p(σ2) dµdmdλ dσ2
by integrating out all the latent variables in the model one-by-one. We begin by not-
ing that convolution of two Gaussians is another Gaussian with summed variances, to
integrate out µ:
p(s) =
∫
N (s|m,σ2 + σ2/λ)N (m|µ0, σ20)Gam(λ|αλ, βλ)InvGam(σ2|aσ, bσ) dm dλ dσ2
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Further, since the inverse gamma distribution is a conjugate prior for Gaussian distribu-
tion with fixed mean, we arrive at the following:
p(s) =
∫
t2aσ (s|m, bσ/aσ(1 + 1/λ))N (m|µ0, σ20)Gam(λ|αλ, βλ) dm dλ
where tν(s|η, ς2) denotes the non-standardized t-distribution with ν degrees of freedom,
mean η and variance ς2. Since the t-distribution can be closely approximated by a
Gaussian distribution, which is its limiting case when ν →∞, even for moderate values
of ν, we can approximate the score distribution by a continuous mixture of Gaussians
with gamma as the mixing distribution:
p(s) ≈
∫
N (s|µ0, σ20 + bσ/aσ(1 + 1/λ))Gam(λ|αλ, βλ) dλ
Note that the distributions inside the integral resemble a conjugate pair, which would
lead to p(s) being the t-distribution. Therefore, we speculate that the distribution p(s)
can be roughly approximated by a Gaussian. In fact, our simulations indicate that
sampling scores from the model results in bell curve shaped histograms. The analysis
above reveals a potential limitation of the proposed model – the assumption that the
distribution is symmetric around the mean.
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